"Uprooting the Golden Bough": J.R.R. Tolkien's Response to Nineteenth Century Folklore and Comparative Mythology

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n his essay On Fairy-Stories and to a lesser extent in his seminal lecture Beowulf: The Monsters and the Critics J.R.R. Tolkien outlined a new approach to the study and appreciation of mythological and fantastic literature.[1] In this essay I wish to examine to what extent Tolkien's claims on this matter were structured in response to the influential analyses of folklore and mythology which had developed during the latter half of the nineteenth century by the separate camps of the comparative mythologists and folklorists. His interest in opposing the secular views of the folklorists in particular, was a consequence of Tolkien's own deeply-held Roman Catholic beliefs.[2] I will approach the issue by first of all giving a brief summary of Tolkien's own claims concerning the truth of mythology before proceeding to outline the claims of the mythologists and folklorists respectively. The culmination of the folklorist approach in particular is taken to be J.G. Frazer's The Golden Bough, first published in 1890. Finally, I will give a more detailed characterization of Tolkien's own approach, indicating at what points they may be taken as responses to nineteenth century claims. Some consequences of this approach for the comparison of Tolkien's academic and popular works will also be noted.

Two central themes are apparent in Tolkien's approach to mythology. On the one hand his work conveys a strong appeal for the Truth of mythological language. Fantasy was for Tolkien a natural human activity capable of reflecting true views of Primary Reality. On the other hand Tolkien also placed considerable emphasis on the importance of regarding myths as the productions of individual authors. To approach myths in this way requires us to see these texts as integrated wholes rather than as collections of mythic motifs and symbols. Tolkien complained, for example, that statements such as "Beowulf is only a version of Dat Erdmänneken" were frequently made in the literature and suggested that this was to devalue the artistic, literary significance of such works.[3]

As an alternative he offered an account of the origins of fairy-stories which placed a strong emphasis on the individual creativity of individual authors interacting with the stock of themes available in a given culture. The metaphor he offered was that of a cook (the author) dipping his laddle into a cauldron of soup. These two themes sit together rather uncomfortably. If myths are to be regarded as the artistic productions of individual authors then Tolkien's claim that mythological language in some sense reflects reality, requires elucidation. The aim of this essay will be to offer a resolution of the dichotomy by regarding Tolkien's claims as specific responses to particular nineteenth century approaches to the study of myth and folktales.

19TH CENTURY DEVELOPMENTS

The science of Comparative Mythology was first widely popularized in Britain in two series

of lectures by the Sanskrit scholar Friedrich Max Müller to the Royal Institution on The Science of Language where the subject was treated as an integral part of Comparative Philology. Max Müller was born in the town of Dassau in 1823 and whilst studying at the University of Leipzig between 1838 and 1841 gradually moved away from his initial interests in classical studies towards the new field of Sanskrit. After studying in Berlin and Paris he came to London in 1846 to seek the financial support of the East India Company for his project of translating the sacred books of India from Sanskrit to English.

In 1850 he was appointed deputy Taylorian Professor of Modern European languages at Oxford and in 1851 he was made an honorary M.A. and a member of Christ Church. Three years later he was promoted to full Taylorian Professor. After 1860, when he failed to be elected to the chair of Sankrit at Oxford for political reasons, Müller moved increasingly towards Comparative Philology and in 1868 a new chair in that subject was created for him, which he held until his death in 1900.[4]

His two series of influential lectures at the Royal Institution were delivered in 1861 and 1863 respectively. Müller classified Comparative Philology as a physical, rather than a historical, science, the difference being that "Physical science deals with the work of God, historical science with the works of man." Comparative mythology therefore bore no relationship to the historical science of Classical Philology:

> Language is here treated simply as a means. The classical scholar uses Greek or Sanskrit, or any other language, as a key to an understanding of the literary monuments which bygone ages have bequeathed to us, as a spell to raise from the tomb of time the thoughts of great men in different ages and different countries, and as a means ultimately to trace the social, moral, intellectual, and religious progress of the human race.[5]

In Comparative Philology on the other hand, the aim of research according to Müller was quite different:

> In the science of language, languages are not treated as a means; language itself becomes the sole object of scientific inquiry.... We do not want to know languages, we want to know language; what language is, how it can form a vehicle or an organ of thought; we want to know its origin, its nature, its laws; and it is only in order to arrive at that knowledge that we collect, arrange, and classify all the facts of language that are within our reach."[6]

These claims must be interpreted in the light of Müller's philosophical claims concerning the relationship between thought and language.

For Müller, thought and language, although not equivalent, were inseparable. Language could not be a human invention since it was a precondition of human understanding. Although we cannot think without language, he claimed, language is not equivalent to thought. We distinguish between thought and language as the inward and outward form of logos. Language therefore necessarily acts on thought and it is in this reaction: "the dark shadow which language throws on thought" that Müller found the solution to the old riddle of mythology:

> Mythology, in the highest sense, is the power exercised by language on thought in every possible sphere of mental activity; and I do not hesitate to call the whole history of philosophy, from Thales to Hegel, an uninterrupted battle against mythology, a constant protest of thought against language.[7]

Müller's problem of mythology was that he considered myths to be absurd. He also believed that the existence of language indicated that from the beginnings of human civilization man had a rational mind. How then could such absurd stories come about? The solution which Müller suggested was to postulate the existence of a mythic or mythopoeic period just prior to the separation of the original Aryan tribes. Language, at this early state of its development, was confined to a system of roots which all referred to definite objects and actions.

According to Müller it was not originally in the power of language to express anything except objects as material, substantial nouns and qualities as active verbs. Thus all roots had originally a purely material and general meaning which could easily be applied to a large number of particular objects or actions. In order to increase the utility of language it was therefore necessary to use these material roots as metaphors: "Thus from roots meaning to shine, to be bright, names were formed for sun, moon, stars, the eyes of man, gold, silver, play, joy, happiness, love."[8]

Müller distinguished two types of metaphor in order to explain the linguistic processes whereby mythology emerged: radical and poetical. A radical metaphor occurred when a root (such as "to shine") was applied to form the names of various objects which had a particular quality in common. A poetical metaphor on the other hand occurred when a root which had already been applied to one particular object or action was transferred poetically to another. The example Müller offered was of the sun's rays being described as the fingers or hands of the sun. As a result, Müller claimed, language became highly poetic, referring to many objects which are homonymous (having the same name) and polynymous (having many names). It was at this stage in the development of language that Müller located the emergence of mythology.

Müller characterized mythology as a disease of language. At its simplest level the claim he made was that if any word which was originally used metaphorically was applied without a clear appreciation of the process that led from its original to its metaphorical meaning, then it becomes mythological. The process he envisaged was that as the original metaphorical link between two words inevitably becomes forgotten, a new link is invented to take its place. For example, since in ancient languages there are no neuter substantives, all words had to be either masculine or feminine. It was therefore impossible to speak of any inanimate object without imputing to those objects something of an "individual, active, sexual, and, at last, personal character."

Thus where we would say something like "the sun follows the dawn" an ancient Aryan would have been obliged to say "the sun embraces" or "the sun loves" the dawn. If objects such as the sun then have a number of names, one of which becomes the commonly-received version, once the original meanings of the others are forgotten, statements originally made about the sun are simply told of a name, which in order to have any meaning must be referred to a god or hero.[9] Mythology was therefore a forgetting of origins, a false connection.

According to Müller therefore, the proper method of Comparative Mythology was to adopt a philological approach and by comparatively studying the names of the gods and heroes of various Aryan cultures to arrive at the original meanings of such names. It would then be possible to recover the processes whereby a myth was invented to replace an alllegory of nature or a metaphorical statement about natural objects. Thus for example the Greek god Zeus is the same word as the Sanskrit Dyaus and originally signified the sky. Myths about Zeus could therefore be understood as having originally been statements about the sky.

The method of Comparative Mythology as defined and defended by Müller first came under serious attack in an article by Andrew Lang, Mythology and Fairy Tales, published in the Fortnightly Review for May 1873.[10] In this paper Lang dismissed the idea of mythology as a disease of language on the basis that it failed to explain the widespread occurrence of familiar mythological themes in the folklore of non-Aryan cultures. He dismissed the role of philology as a tool for the elucidation of mythology, replacing it with ethnology.

Another of Lang's objections to the "disease of language" approach was that it assumed that the proper names which occur in myths hold the key to their interpretation and that they are the oldest surviving part. Lang claimed that "the names may well be, and often demonstrably are, the latest, not the original feature."[11] Thus tales are initially simply told of "somebody" and only in particular local contexts do they acquire a definite reference. In general, according to Lang, stories are anonymous when first told and names are only added later as the stories crystallize around some famous name, heroic, divine or human. In interpreting a story told

of Zeus for example, as a sky-myth, the Comparative Mythologist forgets both that the word "sky" did not mean the same to the mythmaker as it does for the analyst, and that the tale had originally been anonymous and had only later been attributed to Zeus. "If one thing in mythology be certain, it is that myths are always changing masters, that the old tales are always being told with new names."[12]

Having disposed of Comparative Mythology however, Lang still retained Müller's initial problem. Why did apparently civilized races like the Greeks tell such barbarous, absurd tales of their gods? He needed a method which could explain this. The method he proposed was that when some apparently irrational and anomalous custom or myth was found in any culture, the folklorist should look for a culture where a similar custom or myth is found and where the practice is no longer irrational but in harmony with prevailing ideas and manners.

In other words the method he proposed was to compare the seemingly meaningless customs, manners and folktales of civilized races with the analogous ones of the uncivilized which still retained their initial function or meaning. To do this consistently the folklorist must hold that myth is the product of early human fancy, working on the most rudimentary level of knowledge of the outer world and that differences in race or culture do not much affect the early mythopoeic faculty. The myths of civilized races are therefore savage survivals and could be equated with their savage counterparts by identifying the common motifs and mythic symbols which they contain.

Lang was not alone in his rejection of Comparative Mythology. On the contrary he was only one spokesman for a new school of comparative folklore which included such figures as E.S. Hartland, Edward Clodd and most importantly James George Frazer, which institutionalized itself in the formation of the folk-Lore Society in 1878. [13] It is difficult to attribute a single distinctive approach to the various active members of the Society but they all shared a common rejection of Philology as a tool for the study of folklore and almost all insisted on its replacement by a treatment of folktales and customs as savage survivals, to be understood by comparison with the tales and customs of modern savages.

For the folklorists, therefore, the essential elements of folktales were precisely those elements and motifs they held in common and which revealed their common identity in a savage past, demonstrating the essential identity and continuity of thought in early man. E.S. Hartland in his The Science of Fairy Tales could define his subject matter as "Traditionary narratives not in their present form relating to beings held to be divine, nor to cosmological or national events, but in which the supernatural plays an essential part."[14] Literary tales such as those of Hans Christian Andersen were explicitly excluded. The purpose of analysing Tradition as it was captured in Fairy Tales was quite simply to "trace the evolution of civilization from a period before history begins, and through more recent times by channels whereof history gives no account." Hartland drew a fascinating metaphor whereby "Tradition" was seen as a coastline and "culture" or "civilization" as the rising tide "which creeps along the beach, here undermining a heap of sand, there surrounding, isolating and at last submerging a rock.... until all the shore is covered with its waters." The study of tradition was simply a means of studying the rise of civilization. Using his metaphor once more: to understand the course followed by the rising tide of Culture, one must first know the conformation of the "coast".[15]

During its early years the Folk-Lore Society confined itself to comparatively innocuous fields of enquiry, such as the mythology of ancient Greece and Rome, or the quaint customs and rituals of European peasants. Gradually however, attention became directed towards a rather more controversial topic: the Myth of Christianity. The definitive approach was James George Frazer's The Golden Bough, first published in two volumes in 1890 and rapidly expanded to fill twelve volumes by 1915.[16] Frazer's ostensible aim in this text was to provide an explanation for "the remarkable rule which regulated the succession to the priesthood of Diana at Aricia." According to this rule a candidate for the priesthood could only succeed to the office by murdering his predecessor.[17]

Frazer interpreted this as a savage survival from a period in which the priest-king was seen as being the human manifestation of a nature-god who as he became older needed to be sacrificed in order to preserve his powers from being affected by the decay of his human body. In substantiating his claim he referred to numerous other customs which followed the same pattern. He also referred to the numerous myths of the Dying God, including, of course, the Myth of Christianity.

Frazer's claims concerning the identity of the Christian myth with other variants on the Dying God theme were of necessity muted and mostly confined to noting parallels between Christian and pagan festivals. No reader however could miss the implications of the final paragraph of The Golden Bough:

> The temple of the sylvan goddess, indeed, has vanished and the King of the wood no longer stands sentinel over the Golden Bough. But Nemi's woods are still green, and as the sunset fades above them in the west, there comes to us, borne on the swell of the wind, the sound of the church bells of Rome ringing the Angelus. Ave Maria! Sweet and solemn they chime out from the distant city and die lingeringly away across the wide Campagnan marshes. Le roi est mort, vive le roi! Ave Maria![18]

The implication was quite clear: there was no difference between the ancient ritual of sacrificing the priest-king of Diana and the rituals of Christianity still carried out within earshot of the heathen shrine. Nothing had changed and the Dying God lived on.

The implication was certainly not lost on members of the Folk-Lore Society. In his Presidential Address to the Society in 1896, Edward Clodd restated the claim with truly scientific clarity.[19] The mission of folklorists, he claimed, was "to contribute to the freedom of the spirit, to deliver those who, being children of superstition, are therefore the prisoners of fear," and as an example of this emancipatory approach he proceeded to demythologize Christianity. Using the mass of evidence accumulated by Frazer he confirmed the savage basis of the sacramental act, the virgin birth and even the ritual of baptism. All these had their counterpart in savage myth and practice and could only be understood by disclosing their identity with those heathen rites. By demonstrating the origins of these beliefs, the study of folklore could both explain them and emancipate society from their clutches.

TOLKIEN'S RESPONSE:

We can now return to Tolkien and see that in his essay On Fairy-Stories he was fighting two battles. Against Müller and the Comparative Mythologists he was fighting for the integrity and truth of mythological language whilst against the Folklorists he was fighting for the individual integrity of the authors of myth. The two battles coincided in his attempt as a Catholic to preserve the reality and singularity of the Christian myth and its author. As a conservative Catholic he was convinced of the historical truth of the Christian myth but as a philologist with a keen interest in mythology he was well aware of the deep similarities between the myth of Christ and other myths of the Dying God. In order to preserve the truth of the Christian myth he was obliged to allow that other myths were also in some sense true. He was thus led to stand Max Müller's maxim on its head. Far from mythology being a disease of language, Tolkien claimed, it would be "more near the truth to say that languages, especially modern European languages, are a disease of mythology."[20]

Tolkien's views on the relationship between language and mythology were largely based on work by his friend Owen Barfield, particularly his essay Poetic Diction, in which Barfield attempted to formulate a theory of poetic language.[21] For Tolkien, the crucial parts of Barfield's argument were his chapters on metaphor and the meaning of mythological language. Here he offered a new account of the relationship of metaphor, myth and language which differed significantly from that offered by Max Müller. According to Barfield, "the full meanings of words are flashing, iridescent shapes like flames - ever-flickering vestiges of the slowly evolving consciousness beneath them. To the Locke-Müller-France way of thinking, on the contrary, they appear as solid chunks with definite boundaries and limits, to which other chunks may be added as occasion arises."[22]

For Barfield, poetic and apparently metaphorical

meanings were in fact latent in language from the very beginning. Max Müller analyzed the meaning of a word such as the Latin "spiritus" by showing that it acquired a double meaning because at an early stage in its development when it still meant "breath" or "wind" it was employed as a metaphor for the "principle of life." Barfield suggested that "far from the psychic meaning of 'spiritus' having arisen because someone had the abstract idea, 'principle of life...' and wanted a word for it, the abstract idea 'principle of life' is itself a product of the old concrete meaning 'spiritus' which contained within itself the germ of both later significations."[23] Thus the word "spiritus" and its Greek equivalent "pneuma", or rather the older word from which they are descended, did not originally mean either spirit, breath or wind, or even some combination of the three. It simply meant something itself from which the later meanings crystallized.

The crucial point in this for Tolkien was that apparently metaphorical or mythological meanings were inherent in language from its origins. In modern languages a star is simply a ball of inanimate matter, a tree is simply a vegetable organism, but when these words were first invented by men their meanings were completely different. For the speakers of early language the world was alive with mythological beings: the stars were living silver, bursting into flame in answer to the eternal music; the sky was a jewelled tent and the earth the womb which all living things were born. To these early language-makers the whole of creation was "myth-woven and elf-patterned."[24]

Myths therefore were not irrational, debased inventions based on the misunderstanding and forgetting of language. On the contrary, Tolkien claimed that myth-making was as an activity an inherent part of what it means to have a language:

> The mind that thought of light, heavy, grey, yellow, still, swift also conceived of magic that would make heavy things light and able to fly, turn grey lead into yellow gold, and the still rock into swift water. If it could do the one, it could do the other; it inevitably did both. When we take green from grass, blue from heaven, and red from blood, we already have an enchanter's power - upon one plane; and the desire to wield that power in the world external to our minds awakes.[25]

A language without its attendant mythology was for Tolkien inconceivable.

The first stage in Tolkien's argument was therefore the claim that mythmaking is not an irrational activity: it is a natural, rational activity following inevitably from Man's existence as a thinking, speaking being. "The incarnate mind, the tongue and the tale are in our world coeval." This claim however does not necessarily lead to the stronger position that myths are true. Lying is also a natural, rational activity inherent in language. The next stage of Tolkien's argument was directly linked to his Catholic faith and required a re-examination of the basic tenets of comparative folklore.

Folklorists such as Lang or Frazer, despite any specific differences in their work, held in common the claim that the crucial element in folk-tales and customs was their essential similarity which indicated their common source in a savage past. Tolkien however disagreed. For his purposes the recurrence in the different tales of the "same" folklore motif was essentially irrelevant. For him the crucial element in mythology became instead its sheer diversity. "It is precisely the colouring, the atmosphere, the unclassifiable individual details of a story, and above all the general purport that informs with life the undissected bones of the plot that really count."[26] This approach shifts the whole outlook and aim of studying mythology away from the general, comparative approach and emphasizes instead the importance of individual authorship. Tolkien took it for granted that any specific item of mythology would have an individual author. The individuality of myth lay in the way the artist used his material. To use Tolkien's metaphor: the essence of myth lay in the way the Cook selected and combined the ingredients for the Soup.

In what sense then are myths True? Here Tolkien's Catholicism played the crucial role. He claimed that when a man invents a myth or fairy-story he is engaged in a natural human activity which Tolkien called subcreation. This activity of subcreation is both individual and inherent in language. Men as social beings subcreate because that is an inherent part of having a language, but at the same time each man as an individual is a subcreator because he is made in God's image, and God is above all a Creator: "we make in our measure and in our derivative mode, because we are made: and not only made, but made in the image and likeness of a Maker."[27] All myths therefore, in a quite straightforward sense contain elements of Truth. We subcreate because we are made in the image of a Creator, and just as we are like the Creator, our creations are like his Creation. To put it simply, language provides the mythopoeic process with rationality, but God acting through man provides it with Truth.

The Christian myth of Christ as the Dying God was true for Tolkien in an even stronger sense. He did not deny that the gospels contain what is essentially a fairy-story, on the contrary he affirmed this and claimed that as a consequence they convey all the symbolic linguistic significances inherent in mythology. The myth of Christ was however more than just a myth: it was a myth written by God and was therefore also history. The story of Christ was indeed just another variant on the ancient myths of the Dying God, although since myths were to be regarded as individual creations it was not the "same" myth. The crucial point about the Christian myth was that it was a myth that really happened at a specific time and place in history. All the Dying God myths were different because their essence lies in their different treatment of the central theme. Christianity in particular lost none of its force for it had all the symbolic, poetic richness of myth and all the reality of history.

Tolkien claimed that in the Christian myth, subcreation became Creation and that the Gospels were therefore the ultimate verification and justification of the mythmaker's art: "The Evangelium has not abrogated legends it has hallowed them, especially the "happy ending.' The Christian has still to work, with mind as well as body, to suffer, hope, and die; but he may now perceive that all his bents and faculties have a purpose, which can be redeemed." For Tolkien, the historical truth of the Christian myth held out the possibility that all myths had the potential of being true in the same way.[28]

CONCLUSION

Having analysed Tolkien's views on the identity of mythology and language we can now see that the relationship between his philological and mythological work is one of identity as well. At first glance it seems rather perverse that a comparative philologist such as Tolkien should deny the comparative mythologist or folklorist the desire to "unravel the intricately knotted and ramified history of the branches on the Tree of Tales"[29] if Tolkien himself as a philologist were engaged in the same activity as regards language. But Tolkien's analysis of fairy-stories shows that his conception of what it is that philologists should do differed radically from that of Max Müller, for example, who certainly saw himself as being in search of the roots of language.[30] Tolkien made only one explicit remark in On Fairy-Stories concerning his practice of philology,[5] but that remark was indicative: "even with regard to language it seems to me that the essential quality and aptitudes of a given language in a living 'moment' is both more important to seize and far more difficult to make explicit than its linear history."[31] More light can be shed on what Tolkien meant by this remark by considering his paper Chaucer as a Philologist: The Reeve's Tale. Consideration of this paper will also provide some illumination on Tolkien's claim that mythology and philology were simply different ways of approaching the same subject-matter.[32]

In this essay Tolkien claimed that all the efforts made to understand and interpret Chaucer the poet "would chiefly esteem the efforts to recover the details of what he wrote, even (indeed particularly) down to forms and spellings, to capture an idea of what it sounded like, to make certain what it meant... For Chaucer was interested in 'language' and in the forms of his own tongue."[33] By analysing the use of a specific Northern dialect as a joke in Chaucer's The Reeve's Tale he concluded that to carry out the joke successfully as Chaucer had done would require "a private philological interest, and a knowledge too of 'dialect' spoken and written, greater than was usual in his day."[34] Tolkien claimed that Chaucer showed an instinctive appreciation of the current linguistic situation and that the entire

episode was philologically and cleverly contrived.

For Tolkien, Chaucer was a philologist simply in that he showed an accurate and detailed appreciation of the linguistic situation of his own period and a regard for the precise meaning and distribution of words at a given time. This is what Tolkien considered philology to be: an uncovering and appreciation of the general features, peculiarities and genius of a particular language at a particular time and place. The emphasis was on synthesis rather than analysis, and on an attempt to capture a moment in its entirety rather than tracing a particular element back to the beginning of language.

There is a more illuminating sense in which Tolkien could see Chaucer as a philologist. Quite simply Chaucer _used_ his philology in the same way that Tolkien did: he used it to tell a tale. The implication here is that in order to be a good mythmaker, a good teller of tales, one must be a philologist and conversely a good philologist is a mythmaker as well. The Chaucer essay can be regarded as an allegory about how to be a good subcreator: in order to use language as a tool of subcreation the author must be able to understand and appreciate the essential feature of his language. He must understand where it came from and how it works in a particular time and place.

This is what Tolkien meant when he claimed that his own mythological cycle culminating in The Silmarillion and The Lord of the Rings was "primarily linguistic in inspiration."[35] The first stage in Tolkien's subcreative process was the invention of languages and that required the philologist's understanding of what language is and how it functions. In order to be real however and in order to capture the richness of the linguistic process they required a mythology which Tolkien proceeded to invent. In exactly the same way that past and forgotten mythmakers had adapted the themes of their cultural milieu for their own subcreative purposes, Tolkien wrote The Lord of the Rings. If their myths could be true (and they could) then so could his.

NOTES

1. Tolkien's essay On Fairy-Stories was originally delivered as the annual Andrew Lang Lecture for 1939. It was first published in Essays Presented to Charles Williams (Oxford, 1947). All references in this essay are to Tolkien, J.R.R., The Monsters and the Critics and Other Essays (London, 1983).

2. For an account of Tolkien's early conversion to Catholicism see Carpenter, H., J.R.R Tolkien: A Biography (London, 1977). For more information see Carpenter, H. (ed.), Letters of J.R.R. Tolkien (London, 1981) esp. p.109.

3. Tolkien, op. cit. note 1, p.109.

4. Dorson, R., The British Folklorists (London, 1968).

5. Müller, F. Max, Lectures on the Science of Language (London, 1861–64), p.23.

6. ibid. Müller is here subscribing to the standard Victorian ideology of scientific method as the accumulation and classification of facts. The locus classicus is Hershel, J.F.W., Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy (London, 1830).

7. Müller, F. Max, Essays on Mythology and Folklore in Chips from a German Workshop vol. 4 (London, 1895).

8. Müller, op.cit. note 5, p.353.

9. ibid. p.62 onwards.

10. Lang, A., Mythology and Fairy Tales in The Fortnightly Review vol. 13 new series (1873).

11. Lang, A., Custom and Myth (London, 1884), p.4.

12. Lang, ibid, p.6.

13. For an account of the Society's formation and the type of work it promoted, see Dorson, op.cit. note 4.

14. Hartland, E.S., The Science of Fairy Tales (London, 1891), pp.3-4.

15. ibid. p.934.

16. Frazer, J.G., The Golden Bough, 1st ed. (London, 1890) 2 vol., and 2nd ed. (London, 1907-15) 12 vols.

17. Frazer, J.G., The Golden Bough abridged ed. (London, 1920), pp.1-3.

18. ibid. p.934.

19. Clodd, E., Presidential Address in Folklore vol.4 (1896). For an account of the controversies which arose from Clodd's see Dorson, op.cit. note 4.

20. Tolkien, op.cit. note 1, p.122.

21. Barfield, O., Poetic Diction (London, 1928).

22. ibid., p.57.

23. ibid. pp.63-64.

24. This account of Tolkien's claims is based on Carpenter's paraphrasing of Tolkien's poem Mythopoeia. See Carpenter, op.cit. note 2, pp.146-48. [For the complete version of Mythopoeia, see Tolkien, J.R.R., Tree and Leaf 2nd edition (London, 1988), pp.97-101., and Christopher Tolkien's introduction, pp.5-8. Ed.]

25. Tolkien, op.cit. note 1, p.122.

26. ibid., pp.119-20. Tolkien's claim that Art should be considered as a whole rather than as a collection of individuated parts comes through in the conversation between Gandalf and Saruman:

    " 'White! ... It serves as a beginning. White cloth may be dyed. The white page can be overwritten; and the white light can be broken.'

    'In which case it is no longer white ... and he who breaks a thing to find out what it is has left the path of wisdom.' "
    The Fellowship of the Ring, rev. ed. Unwin Paperbacks (London, 1979), p.339.

27. Tolkien, op.cit. note 1, p.145.

28. ibid., pp.155-57.

29. ibid., p.120.

30. Müller, op.cit., note 5, pp.22-24.

31. Tolkien, op.cit., note 1, p.120.

32. Tolkien, J.R.R., Chaucer as a Philologist: the Reeve's Tale in Transactions of the Philological Society (1934).

33. ibid., p.1.

34. ibid., p.3.

35. Tolkien, op.cit., note 26, p.9.

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